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Abstract: Low levels of public goods provision in many developing countries’ 
rural communities often force the poor to approach someone with considerable 
command over both financial and social resources to act as their patron. 
However engaging with the patron – typically a landlord – does not guarantee 
public provision, as inequality and lack of alternative options considerably 
weakens peasants’ bargaining power, thus enabling the landlord to use peasant’ 
votes to secure public resources for his own benefit. This paper proposes to 
increase peasants’ bargaining power, and thus their ability to pressurize their 
patron to broker public goods for them, by increasing their alternative options 
through connectivity. In order to empirically test the viability of this solution the 
paper makes use of a natural experiment found in the construction of a motorway 
in Pakistan. Using household-level data, the study shows that households situated 
close to the road enjoy a significantly higher level of public investment when 
compared to similar peasants living in isolated villages. Moreover, the data finds 
the beneficial impact of connectivity is felt most strongly by the socially lower 
classes within rural society.  
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The literature on economic development places considerable emphasis on public 
goods1 provision as a means of enhancing the welfare of the poor and reducing 
inequality. However, despite this concern, researchers have found that public 
investment in many developing countries is skewed in favours of wealthier ‘elites’ 
(see for example Banerjee and Somanathan 2007, Bardhan and Mookherjee 2002, 
Gazdar 2000, Charlton, et al. 2003). Elite capture has meant that public funds, 
which are ear-marked in the budget to alleviate poverty, are being appropriated for 
the benefit of the resource rich. This failure on the part of the state to provide for 
its citizens has meant that the poor are forced to pursue alternative avenues to 
fulfil their needs. Often this involves approaching someone who has command 
over considerable resources, both financial and social, and is willing to act as a 
patron (Scott1972, Powell 1970). Aligning with a patron does not, however, 
guarantee provision of public goods. Depending on the patron’s bargaining power 
vis-à-vis citizens, clients might find themselves in a situation where the patron 
contracts with the local politician to secure public resources for his own private 
benefit in exchange for his clients’ votes (Powell 1970, Keefer 2004, Scott and 
Kerkvliet 1977), leading to their exclusion from public spending decisions.  
 
Thus the vulnerable groups in society, who are most in need of state resources, are 
most likely to get caught in a low-provision equilibrium. Efforts to alter this 
welfare reducing equilibrium can look at ways to change the relative bargaining 
powers in this relationship so as to empower clients to demand that the patron 
broker public goods for them. Bargaining power within the patron-client network, 
according to Scott and Kerkvliet (1977), is a function of the level of inequality 
and the number of options available to clients for satisfying their needs. Large 
scale inequality in developing countries has meant that most income generating 
assets are concentrated in a few hands forcing the resource poor to depend on 
them for earning a livelihood (World Bank 2000). Moreover, bad infrastructure 
has meant that rural areas tend to be isolated from the wider national economy, 
thus reducing the ability of the citizens to access the external market. Together, 
inequality and isolation make the patron a monopolist/monopsonist, able to 
exploit his position of privilege (Bhaduri 1977). Policies aiming to change the 
                                                
1 Public goods are defined not as pure public goods, rather as all goods provided by the state 
(Banerjee and Somanathan 2007).  
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relative bargaining powers can then either focus on trying to reduce inequality or 
the level of isolation in rural economies.  
 
Policies dealing with inequality – such as progressive taxes, welfare schemes and 
land reforms – are often politically contentious and difficult to implement, 
particularly in the short to medium term. High levels of corruption in developing 
countries have made tax evasion pervasive and funds meant for welfare 
enhancement tend to get appropriated by the elite. Furthermore, while some 
countries have had relative success with land reforms, others have been unable to 
implement a workable policy. It is also questionable whether land reforms alone 
are a welfare enhancing policy solution. While on the one hand peasants obtain 
control over a major income generating asset, thus allowing them to enjoy 
considerable economic independence, on the other it can create a vacuum in other 
aspects of their lives as patrons often perform functions the state is failing to do so 
(e.g. dispute resolution, social security, and sometimes even access to public 
goods) (Bardhan 1980). 
  
As an alternative short to medium term solution, this paper proposes looking at 
policy options that reduce isolation and increase the number of options available 
to clients for satisfying their needs, thus breaking the monopoly/monopsony of the 
local patron. While there are a number of ways in which citizens can be provided 
with outside options, this paper explores the effect connectivity, through road 
networks,2 has on previously isolated rural economies. It is argued that road 
networks provide citizens with an exit option and thus alter the relative bargaining 
powers in rural societies. When faced with these new options patrons can respond 
in one of three ways. They can chose to do nothing in which case they are bound 
to lose their clientelist following.3 They can resort to violence and try to bar 
clients from engaging with the external market. While this could work in the short 
to medium term, it erodes peasant loyalty, thus becoming very costly in the long 
run (Scott & Kerkvliet, 1977). A third possibility is that the patron can try and 
preserve his clientelist following by giving the peasants’ needs due consideration. 
                                                
2 Connectivity can also be increased through telephone connections or access to computers and the 
internet (though this requires an educated population that is able to read and write).  
3 A breakdown of the existing patron-client network need not mean the end of clientelism. It might 
simply result in the poor establishing vertical links, possibly with different terms, with new actors 
in the economy (Scott and Kerkvliet 1977, Fox 1994).   
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Making use of empirical data collected from rural Pakistan, the paper finds that 
connectivity does in fact alter the contract4 between the patron and the politician. 
Competition from the market has meant that the patron is no longer able to 
demand clients’ votes without delivering some public goods in return.  
 
The remainder of the paper is arranged as follows: Section 1 briefly outlines the 
main characteristics of patron-client networks, highlighting clients’ low 
bargaining power in the presence of inequality and isolation. Section 2 discusses 
the perverse incentives clientelist networks create for politicians and the resultant 
welfare implications they have for poor citizens. Section 3 looks at the proposed 
solution of connectivity as a means of increasing clients’ bargaining power so as 
to divert public resources towards satisfying their needs. Section 4 analyses 
empirical data collected from rural Hafizabad, Pakistan to evaluate whether the 
motorway has actually helped mitigate some of the harmful effects that patronage 
politics have on public goods provision and Section 5 concludes by outlining the 
major policy implications. 
 
1. Patron-Client Network – A Lopsided Friendship 
 
The patron-client relationship is a bond between a group of unequals born out of 
necessity and mutual benefit (Powell 1970, Scott and Kerkvliet 1977, Mason 
1986). On the one hand, the network consists of clients who own very little, if 
any, assets and are under constant threat from fluctuations in their environment; 
both natural (diseases, famines, accidents and deaths) and manmade (threats of 
violence, injustice and exclusion) (Powell 1970). In order to try and ameliorate 
these hazards the peasant clients approach a figure of authority to act as their 
‘patron’.  
 
The patron, on the other hand, is someone with a command over resources – both 
material and social. Due to his considerable wealth and social standing vis-à-vis 
the clients, he is able to ensure that at least the peasants’ basic needs are met and 
that the household is protected against exploitation by a third party (Scott and 
                                                
4 This contract in an informal agreement between the patron and the local politician. 
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Kerkvliet 1977).5 This is done by providing a number of services such as 
employment, social insurance, rent-free housing, low interest or interest free 
credit, protection from harassment, dispute resolution, access to the local 
politician and (sometimes but not always) provision of public goods (Scott 1972, 
Powell 1970). In return, the peasant is expected to provide the patron with 
economic, social and political favours and/or services. The client is, for instance, a 
source of cheap labour for the patron to use on his lands and in his house as 
domestic help. This work is often done at a wage below the market rate which 
helps the patron decrease his costs (Scott and Kerkvliet 1977, Ahmad 1977, Rouse 
1988). The client moreover increases the social standing of the patron by being a 
member of his clientelist group; the more clients a patron has as followers the 
more powerful he is perceived to be. Lastly, peasants can provide the patron with 
political favours by agreeing to vote, without questions asked, for the candidate 
the patron supports (Scott and Kerkviet 1976), thus enabling the patron to wield 
considerable influence over politicians. 
 
Peasants in rural communities are found to be disadvantaged in this relationship 
due to three interconnected reasons. Firstly, the needs (demands) of the peasants 
are fairly inelastic as they deal with goods and services vital to their survival, and 
they may have few other options for satisfying them (Scott & Kerkvliet 1977). 
This is particularly true for landless households.6 The patron’s demand curve, on 
the other hand, is relatively flat due to the large number of clients available to 
perform the tasks he needs done (Powell 1970, Mason 1986).7 Secondly, the 
resources of the patron are limited – sometimes they can be extremely limited8 – 
and have to be distributed over a large number of clients. Therefore, peasants need 
to compete, on the basis of their material wealth9 and social standing10, with one 
another to secure as much of the patron’s resources as they can for themselves. 
                                                
5 This is not to say that the patron does not exploit them.  
6 Land owning households have a greater ability to satisfy their own needs and so are slightly 
better off (Scott 1976). 
7 This problem becomes severer with every generation due to population increase (Scott 1972). 
8 For instance, in Pakistan it was found that while these patrons/landlords are rich men in their 
villages, in cities they would be considered little more than glorified peasants.  
9 Some peasants might own a small amount of land or may own some livestock that can help 
generate some income. 
10 The social status of a peasant household may be determined by their kinship group or their caste 
or tribe. 
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Hence, households which are socially and materially poor are least likely to 
benefit from patronage and are most vulnerable to exploitation. 
 
Thirdly, the patron, due to his high level of control, is able to impose sanctions in 
the case of non-compliance. These sanctions can be economic, social and/or 
political in nature (Powell 1970). Economic sanctions can be imposed through 
employment termination, eviction and/or refusal of credit (Mason 1986). 
Ownership of the majority of land in rural societies gives the patron control over a 
major income generating asset, which means that a disagreement with him could 
result in exclusion from the main (and often sole) source of employment. Also, his 
land ownership could extend to peasants’ homestead land and so defection of any 
form could very likely lead to eviction.11 Lastly, the patron can refuse to give the 
peasant credit which in agricultural economies, where income fluctuates 
considerably with the seasons, can be devastating.  
 
Socially the patron can ostracise the peasant and his family, essentially barring 
them from availing the advantages of social insurance. In many developing 
countries, where there are no formal insurance mechanisms in place, the onus of 
protection falls mostly on society at large. Thus peasants rely on fellow citizens to 
come to their assistance when faced with idiosyncratic disasters (Dasgupta 1993). 
Ostracized households are left vulnerable to fluctuations in their environment as 
they are unable to tap into this network in times of need. Moreover, the patron can 
ensure that the peasant is excluded from any form of public goods provision. By 
virtue of his control over multiple votes, the patron can have considerable 
leverage over sitting politicians (see for example Scott1972, Powell 1970, Fox 
1994) which can be used to persuade them to target public goods away from the 
defecting peasant (Rouse 1988). Cheema and Mohmand (2004), when studying 
Sargodha, Pakistan, found that households not aligned with the village influential 
(patron) were blatantly excluded from provision of goods such as drains and 
paved streets, even if they were situated in a neighbourhood patronized by the 
politician.12 Lastly if all else fails, the patron can impose his will on his client 
                                                
11 These rent contracts are informal in nature, therefore their terms can be altered at anytime. 
12 They found that drain systems would stop outside non-aligned households and start again from 
the next house. Clearly the functionality of the drain was not given much importance. The same 
was true of paved streets. 
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through coercion and brute force. Scott and Kerkvliet (1977) argue that while this 
would ensure that peasants comply with the patron’s wishes, it is likely to have an 
adverse effect on their loyalty towards the patron.  
 
The patron’s ability to impose these sanctions is influenced by two factors. First 
and foremost, his ability to coerce is dependent on the environment in which the 
relationship is cultivated. In isolated societies the patron has a high level of 
control as peasants have few, if any, outside options (Powell 1970, Basu 1983, 
Bhaduri 1977, Basu 1986). The patron, in this case, is often the main source of 
employment, the only source of credit, the provider of social insurance and the 
only link to the local politician. Provision of multiple services enables him to 
interlink markets, causing the outcome in one market to be jointly determined 
with the outcome in other markets (Basu 1986, Bell 1988, Bardhan 1980).13 This 
makes disagreements with the patron very costly as it can have consequences in 
multiple markets. Secondly, failure of governmental institutions in many 
developing countries has meant that the patron does not have to bear the 
consequences of certain activities (such as violence and extortion) that he 
otherwise would have had to if policing and the judiciary functioned better 
(Chabal and Daloz 1999). It also means that peasants have to rely on the patron 
for services which would normally be provided by the state (Weingrod 1968, 
Scott 1969, Cheema, et al. 2007, Ananthpur 2007, Krishna 2002).  
 
Clearly this is a “lopsided friendship” (Pitt-Rivers 1954:140) with the patron 
having the advantage. While this has multiple consequences on the welfare of the 
peasant, this paper focuses on the impact this relationship has on political 
behaviour and the consequent outcomes in terms of public goods provision. 
 
2. The Deals Politicians Make 
 
Despite the well documented link between public goods provision and poverty 
alleviation, researchers have found that many developing countries continue to 
suffer from low levels of provision. This is particularly true of countries which are 
                                                
13 For an overview of the literature on interlinked markets see Bardhan (1980). 
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young democracies. Keefer (2007) documents that as countries make the 
transition to democracy there is actually a fall in the level of provision enjoyed by 
citizens. This, at first, seems counter-intuitive as democracies are thought to 
perform better than non-democratic governments, as they set out to meet the 
needs of the majority who, in developing countries, are usually the poor rural 
communities (see for example Acemoglu and Robinson 2006, Baum and Lake 
2001, Przeworski et. al. 2000, Sen 1999). An explanation to this conundrum can 
be found in the presence of patronage politics and the effect it has on the incentive 
structure for politicians. 
 
Keefer (2007) highlights that one of the problems politicians face in young 
democracies is the inability to make credible pre-election commitments to their 
constituents.14 This makes campaigning very expensive and ineffective and 
therefore forces them to create alliances with someone who has credibility with 
the voters. In the presence of clientelist networks patrons can perform this 
function as, due to their face-to-face contact with peasants, they are perceived as 
being highly credible (Scott and Kerkvliet 1977, Powell 1970).  
 
Aligning with the patron entails an exchange of votes – both of the patron and his 
clients – for certain services from the politicians. The patron is able to deliver a 
large number of votes as one of the services peasants provide to their patron is to 
agree to vote for the candidate he is supporting. This means that the patron in 
effect ‘controls’ a few hundred (if not more) votes which can be traded with 
politicians, as individual clients are unlikely to vote against the wishes of the 
patron due to fear of being sanctioned. This holds even when formal assurances of 
ballot secrecy are made, as peasants are unlikely to believe that their voting 
decisions are kept hidden from the patron (Mason and Joshi 2008).15 Politicians, 
in return, are expected to reciprocate by providing the patron with a combination 
of private goods (e.g. money, housing, land), targeted public goods (e.g. paved 
roads, drains, street lighting) and public goods for those clients who have 
relatively high bargaining power. As a result of this contracting, the politician is 
                                                
14 Political parties in young democracies do not have precedents that they can rely on to establish 
their credibility. 
15 As Mason and Joshi (2008) highlight this problem is even more pronounced in young 
democracies as peasants have no past experience of their decisions being kept secret from the 
patron. 
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bound to become disengaged from the masses as any form of public spending has 
to be brokered through the patron, who in turn decides on the level of 
redistribution (Mason and Joshi 2008, Keefer 2007).16  
 
Contracting with patrons is cheaper for the politician than providing public goods 
to the masses for two reasons. Firstly, in the presence of patronage politics the 
number of people politicians need to satisfy shrinks from a winning majority of 
constituents to a winning majority of patrons (Mason and Joshi 2008). Secondly, 
contracting with a patron guarantees results as defection on the part of the patron 
is easily detectable due to the large number of votes he controls. This is contrasted 
with contracting with citizens who, by virtue of constituting a minute fraction of 
the voting body, can renege (mostly by choosing not to vote) without detection 
(Keefer 2004).17 Contracting with the patron solves this problem and thus takes 
away the probabilistic nature of success in democracies. However, the 
disadvantage is that it significantly reduces the politician’s incentive to spend 
public resources on poor constituents.  
 
This is an ideal situation for both politicians and patrons. Provided politicians can 
contract with enough patrons, they can guarantee victory in an election, something 
they could never achieve in the absence of clientelist politics. For patrons this is 
yet another avenue through which to expropriate resources. The only losers are 
the clients with low bargaining power vis-à-vis their patron, who are unable to 
pressure him to include public goods provision for them in his contract with the 
politician. 
 
3. The Impact of Connectivity 
 
Given the aim of improving the welfare of the poor, it is worth exploring solutions 
to the low provision equilibrium found under clientelism. As mentioned above, 
the problem with patronage politics is that clients with low bargaining power are 
excluded from the contract between patrons and politicians. Therefore, solutions 
                                                
16 Corruption, coupled with low levels of accountability, enables politicians to expropriate 
resources without having to face the consequences. 
17 Monitoring citizens’ voting decisions, by the politician, is either not possible when balloting is 
secret, or prohibitively expensive when it is not as there are too many citizens. 
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need to focus on ways of improving peasant bargaining power. These solutions 
can range from land reforms to fiscal policy initiatives to increasing the number of 
outside options available to peasants. As highlighted in the introduction, land 
reforms and fiscal policy reforms are politically contentious policies which have 
proven to be very difficult to implement.  
 
As an alternative I propose looking at ways of increasing peasants’ outside 
options so as to reduce their dependence on the patron. As mentioned in Section 1, 
poor peasants tend to have low bargaining power vis-à-vis the patron due to two 
interconnected factors; the relative inelasticity of their demands and the 
monopolistic/monopolistic powers of the patron resulting from isolation, both of 
which give him considerable leverage to dictate his terms.18 In order to increase 
peasants’ bargaining power efforts need to be made to reduce their dependence on 
the patron by increasing their exit options (Mason 1986). The availability of 
multiple avenues for provision takes away the patron’s ability to impose economic 
sanctions on the peasants. It also makes the threat of defection, on the part of the 
clients, more credible and one they can use to their advantage (Blok 1974, 
Weingrod and Morin 1971). 
  
These alternative avenues can be created in two main ways – through government 
policy or market intervention. Government policy can be used to try to reduce the 
functions performed by the patron as most of these fall in the purview of state 
functionality. This calls for a reform initiative – for instance in the judiciary and 
the political system – so as to make government resources work better for the 
poor. This entails providing a viable avenue of conflict resolution, a more 
responsive police force and creating a political system that is more accessible, 
responsive and accountable to the masses. These reforms, however, are bound to 
be very expensive, both politically and financially, and unless implemented 
properly, run the risk of falling short of their objectives. 
  
                                                
18 Even if there are two or three patrons in the village that does not necessarily mean that the 
peasant has access to other patrons. For instance Platteau (1995) documents that in India age-old 
agreements between large patrons has meant that each may refuse to take in the others’ defecting 
clients.  
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A more viable alternative can be provided through the realm of market 
intervention, by reducing isolation that has been documented to increase the 
authority of the patron as it firmly establishes his monopoly in the village 
economy (see for example Powell 1970, Bhaduri 1977, Scott and Kerkvliet 1977). 
Connecting villages, through road networks, besides having a positive effect on 
agricultural productivity, has the ability to challenge the monopoly of the patron, 
thus reducing his authority over peasants. This could come through three main 
avenues; an increase in employment options, a possible influx of new patrons and 
an increase in the general level of awareness.  
 
Connecting villages to the external market provides peasants with alternative 
forms of employment,19 – both in nearby towns and cities and within the villages, 
created by increased traffic – which the patron can neither influence nor control. 
These new employment opportunities have the potential to break the monopsony 
of the patron in the labour market, thus forcing him to offer terms at par with the 
market. This, besides leading to an increase in the peasants’ standard of living, 
removes the patron’s ability to use the threat of economic sanctions as a means of 
controlling them (Block 1974, Weingrod and Morin 1971). This economic 
emancipation should give the peasants added leverage to negotiate better terms, 
not just in the economic market, but also in other markets controlled by the 
patron.  
 
The landlord has limited ability to either capture these new opportunities or to bar 
villagers from participating in them, as it would entail erecting a barrier on the 
road network so as to restrict traffic (and external traders) from coming to the 
village. The costs of doing this effectively would most often be extremely high – 
almost prohibitive. Alternatively the patron could make use of violence to bar 
peasants from participating in the newly available market opportunities. However, 
besides having legal implications, this too is a costly option as it leads to a loss of 
peasant loyalty in an environment where peasants are valuable, at the very least, 
for their political support (Scott 1972). Therefore the costs borne by the patrons in 
                                                
19 It is important to note that the availability of new employment opportunities does not necessarily 
mean that the peasant will switch employment. The beneficial impact for the peasants might be the 
credible threat of defection that these new options provide, thus enabling them to negotiate better 
terms. 
FOI Working Paper 2010/13    
 
12 
trying to increase peasants’ costs of approaching the external market would 
outweigh the benefits from such activities, and so peasants should experience an 
increase in their alternative options. 
 
Furthermore, increased accessibility might also attract an influx of new actors 
wanting to take advantage of the villages’ connectivity.20 This inflow could 
include potential new patrons who could provide peasants with a possible 
alternative to the current patron for provision (Rouse 1988). These new potential 
patrons create competition for existing patrons, possibly leading to an increase in 
services to the clients.21 One outcome of this competition may be for existing 
patrons to contract with the politician to direct public investment towards their 
clients. Lastly, connectivity can be expected to increase the level of awareness 
amongst peasants regarding their rights and the responsibility of the local 
politician towards them. These better informed peasants are more likely to 
demand public goods provision in exchange for their votes.22  
 
Thus, through these multiple changes, connectivity should work to increase 
peasants’ bargaining power and strengthen their position vis-à-vis the patron. 
While the increase in outside options is not likely to break the network as a whole, 
it should be enough to force the patron to give peasants’ welfare due 
consideration. Specifically, in terms of public goods provision this would mean 
that in exchange for their votes peasants should now be able to demand some level 





                                                
20 These new patrons need not be land owners. Rouse (1988) documents the emergence of a 
goldsmith as a new patron in Jalpana, Pakistan thus threatening the authority of the existing 
landlord.  
21 Since these are new patrons they are not bound by the age old agreement between patrons as 
found by Platteau (1995). It should be noted, however, that these new patrons might collude with 
existing ones so as to exploit the peasant rather than act as their competitors. 
22 Literature documents that an informed voter is much less likely to be ignored by politicians in 
their public spending decisions (see for example Prat and Strömberg 2006, Besley et. al. 2002, 
Besley and Burgess 2002, Olsen 1982). 
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4. Empirical Analysis 
 
Making use of a natural experiment found in Punjab, Pakistan this section tries to 
evaluate whether increased connectivity has, in fact, been able to increase public 
goods provision for peasants residing in villages dominated by a large patron. 
 
Pakistan is a good case study for this analysis for two interconnected reasons. 
Firstly, it has in place extensive patron-client networks infiltrating into almost 
every aspect of villagers’ lives (see for example Gazdar 2000, Ahmad 1977, 
Rouse 1988, Cheema and Mohmand 2006). Secondly, the country suffers from 
low levels of accountability and weak institutional structures, thus making it 
possible for politicians to appropriate public funds without having to face severe 
consequences (Keefer 2005). As Gazdar (2000) notes, these institutional flaws 
have meant that public goods in Pakistan are used more “as a currency for the 
disbursement of patronage” (pg. 77) than as a means for enhancing welfare.     
 
What further makes Pakistan a good choice for this study is the motorway the 
federal government constructed in 1998, connecting Lahore (a major 
cosmopolitan city and the provincial capital of Punjab) to Islamabad (the capital 
of the country). Along the 365 km of this road there are multiple exits, each of 
which has a link road connecting the motorway to the nearest city/town. These 
link roads run past villages which were previously connected mostly by dirt trails 
which minimised traffic and restricted peasant mobility. Through its extensive 
network of link roads, the motorway has resulted in an increase in both peasant 
mobility, through an influx of cheap transport facilities, and travellers passing 
through the villages. While mobility allows peasants to explore employment 
options outside the village economy, increased traffic leads to new jobs being 
created within the village itself in the form of roadside cafes, vehicle repair shops, 
general stores, etc. Additionally, the motorway has had a positive spill-over effect 
on the level of awareness in the villages as exposure has meant an increase in 
information regarding the national economy.  
 
The location of the motorway was determined by the federal government based on 
three main considerations – geography, connectivity and defence (Republic 
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Engineering Corporation Limited 1988).23 Firstly, efforts were made to ensure 
that the road ran through as few geographical hazards as possible so as to 
minimise the risk of road accidents.24 Secondly, the federal government wanted to 
connect these two major cities with a motorway that was not very close to the old 
highway, and one which passed through as many towns and villages as possible 
without hampering the economic benefits to traders.25 Lastly, the Air Force has a 
bombing range situated between Lahore and Islamabad which made some of the 
suggested routes unusable. None of these factors are systematically related to 
specific village characteristics.  
 
There were rumours however, that the placement of the road was changed from 
the original plan so as to allow it to run past the lands of large landlords. While I 
was unable to find evidence to confirm this, I identified areas where the motorway 
was not altered from the original plan in any way. Among these was Hafizabad, 
Punjab. In the area selected for this study the landlords, while commanding 
considerable authority in their own villages, would be considered part of the lower 
middle class in urban settings. This was quite evident from the houses they lived 
in, the cars they drove, the schools they sent their children to and their own levels 
of education. Therefore, they lacked the influence needed to alter the federal 
government’s decision regarding the placement of a national highway. Hence the 
decision to make the motorway run through this area was independent of 
individual village level characteristics, making it an exogenous shock to the 
village economies and social relations. 
 
4.1. Methodology 
The empirical study makes use of data collected from household level surveys in 
villages located at varying proximity to the motorway26 to analyse the impact 
connectivity has had on public goods provision. The area chosen was Hafizabad 
                                                
23 Mr. Chaudry Muhammad Altaf, Chairman National Highway Authority, interview, 15 April 
2008. 
24 Particular attention was paid to a salt range situated between Lahore and Islamabad, as passing 
through the salt range required the construction of winding roads which, it was believed, would 
increase the chances of motor accidents. Therefore the government wanted to minimise the stretch 
that ran through this area.   
25 The benefits of connecting additional towns and villages had to be weighed against the costs of 
the route between the two main cities being stretched to facilitate increased access. 
26 When talking about villages being close to the road, reference is made to their distance from a 
link road. The motorway itself is a fenced off road and presents no benefit to villages close to it. 
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district in Punjab, Pakistan.27 The motorway passes though the district with two 
exits connecting it to nearby towns – Hafizabad City and Pindi Bhattian.28 Eight 
villages were chosen with four being situated close to the motorway link roads, 
while the other four were at a distance of between eight and eleven kilometres 
from the road. Travelling to distant villages took 40 -90 minutes by car from the 
motorway exit, due to the bad infrastructure. Moreover, interviews with 
households revealed that peasants often had to wait up to an hour to get a ride to 
the nearby town or city. Villages situated close to the motorway, on the other 
hand, are now highly accessible as they have experienced a substantial increase in 
the number of transport facilities available to them. Most households in such 
villages claimed to have to wait less than ten minutes to get a ride to the nearby 
town.29 This increased traffic has not only made it possible for villagers to travel 
to nearby towns and cities to look for work, but has also led to an increase in 
employment options within the villages themselves, focused on servicing passers-
by. Whereas 51% of households in connected villages felt that there had been an 
increase in employment opportunities outside the agricultural sector only 37% felt 
the same in isolated villages.30 This difference is significant at the 1% level. 
 
Apart from the level of isolation, the villages also varied in the type of land tenure 
system in place. Hafizabad has historically had considerable variation in its land 
distribution making it possible to find villages where a single landlord owns the 
majority of the village resources (landlord dominated villages), as well as those 
where landholdings are spread over a considerable number of households, leading 
to the establishment of multiple patrons (peasant based villages).31 The 
distribution of land has a direct impact on the level of control the patron can 
exercise. In landlord dominated villages the patron, due to his large landholdings, 
has a greater level of control compared to a patron in peasant based villages, 
where dispersed land ownership has created multiple small patrons. However, it is 
worth mentioning that even in peasant based villages the incidence of landlessness 
                                                
27 Restricting the sample to villages within a district has the advantage of allowing us to rule out 
the possibility that differences in public investment could be driven by differences in the district’s 
fiscal capacities.  
28 This study focuses on the exit to Hafizabad City.  
29 They also talked about the ride being extremely cheap. 
30 The agricultural sector is largely controlled by the patron. 
31 Land distribution was historically determined by the British revenue collecting machinery 
making it exogenous to this model. For a discussion on land distribution under British rule over 
India, see Nelson (2010). 
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is extremely high. The difference in these villages is that the multiplicity of 
patrons, each competing against the other to win the support of the peasant, 
enables the landless to have relatively higher bargaining power.  
 
The choice to focus on villages with varying land tenure systems follows from 
Banerjee and Iyer’s (2005) finding of low public investment in villages dominated 
by large landlords in comparison with relatively egalitarian ones. The expectation 
then is that connectivity should have a much stronger effect on landlord 
dominated villages than on peasant based ones. In order to evaluate the 
differential impact of connectivity on villages with differing land tenure systems, 
four of the eight selected villages are dominated by a large landlord while four are 
peasant based villages. Moreover, for each group, two villages have the link road 
run through them, while two are situated far away.  
 
                          Landlord Dominated                     Egalitarian 
Close to the 
Motorway                 2   2  
 
 
Far from the        2   2 
Motorway 
   
Landholdings of the patrons in landlord based villages varied between 100 and 
300 acres. This land ownership often extended to the peasants’ homestead land, 
making them rent-free tenants. Average landholding amongst the peasants in 
landlord dominated villages was 5.4 acres,32 with 55% of the population being 
landless. In peasant based villages the average landholding was 6.3 acres and 54% 
households were landless. Monthly household expenditure was $100 and $103 in 
landlord and peasant based villages respectively. While 54% of households in 
landlord dominated villages were headed by an illiterate person, the 
corresponding figure in peasant based villages was 45%. Moreover, each village 
had households belonging to both the upper and lower class biraderies (kinship 
groups). 
 
                                                
32 It is worth mentioning that these small landholders usually made use of family labour and thus 
did not provide an alternative form of employment for other peasants. 
FOI Working Paper 2010/13    
 
17 
Within the eight villages household level surveys were conducted by a team of 14 
surveyors, supervised by myself, over a period of three months. The surveying 
process involved mapping the villages,33 identifying the biradery (kinship group) 
of each household and surveying a stratified random sample of 20% of the 
households. Stratification was done along biradery lines as literature on South 
Asia documents this as being a good proxy for social status (see for example 
Ahmad 1977, Cheema and Mohmand 2006).34 The aim was to ensure that the 
sample was representative of all biraderies so that no bias arose in the result due 
to over or under sampling of particular social groups. Within the villages visited 
the upper class biraderies were the Kharrals and the Bhattis. These were 
historically the land owning classes, which gave them their elevated status. 
However, a Kharral or a Bhatti household is considered upper class even if it is 
landless. The lower class households are comprised of the Muslim Sheikhs and 
the Ansaris. These biraderies were historically not allowed to own land. 
Interestingly, even though there is no legal restriction against them owning land 
today, almost all households of these biraderies are still landless. The status of 
Muslim Sheikh households is further lowered as this biradery is responsible for 
performing menial tasks which other households consider demeaning (such as 
cleaning the village drains). The biradery of the household is important as it 
influences its relationship with the patron. The upper class biraderies, besides 
having an elevated social standing, often also shared their biradery with the 
landlord, thus creating an extra tie to rely on. 
 
The questionnaire used is broadly divided into four sections; public goods 
provision, politics, socio-political needs and household profile. The section on 
public goods asked questions pertaining to education, health, roads, paved streets 
and drainage systems. For each public good, questions were asked regarding the 
time of provision (before or after the construction of the motorway), who they 
believed was the intermediary that helped provide the good and how satisfied they 
were with the service.  
 
                                                
33 There are no official or unofficial maps of these villages. My maps are the first record of the 
layout of these villages, at least since 1947. 
34 For a detailed discussion on social stratification and biradery status in a Punjabi village see 
Ahmad (1977). 
FOI Working Paper 2010/13    
 
18 
The analysis in this paper is restricted to two public goods; paved streets and 
drainage systems. The reason for this choice lies in the nature of these goods and 
the way in which they are provided in Pakistan. Paved streets and drains in 
Pakistan are not ‘pure’ public goods.35 While they are non-rival, others can be 
excluded from their usage. This holds true even within a neighbourhood, where 
one would intuitively expect goods like paved streets and drainage systems to be 
non-excludable in order to be effective. However, this is not necessarily the case 
as a politician can exclude a single household from the provision of these goods 
even if the houses next door are being provided with them.36 This excludability 
makes these goods well suited for the purpose of this study. 
 
Schooling and health care, the other main public goods, are not being considered 
for two interconnected reasons. Firstly, these goods are universal public goods, 
which once provided, are usually available for everyone to use.37 Secondly, these 
goods, as provided in rural Pakistan, are meant to service not only the village in 
which they are situated, but also other villages in its proximity. This means that 
restricting peasants’ access would entail barring them from the usage of public 
goods found in other villages. This is difficult for the patron to ensure as his 
jurisdiction usually does not extend to other villages.38 Thus it is reasonable to 
assume that the patron and the politician do not enjoy the same level of control 
over these goods. The basic logistic regression models estimated are: 
 
Y = α + β1MW + β2LL + β3Land+β4Bh+ β5`Kh +β6An + β7MS+ ξ  
     (1) 
Y = α + β1MW + β2LL + β3MW*LL+ β4Land +β5Bh+ β6Kh +β7An + β8MS + ξ 
     (2) 
Y is a binary variable taking the value of 1 if the household has a public good 
provided to it, 0 otherwise. Distance from the road, MW, takes the value of 1 if 
                                                
35 Pure public goods are non-rival – one person’s use does not diminish the quantity available for 
another person – and are non-excludable – it is not possible to bar others from using it. 
36 Clearly the functionality of the drains and pavements were not taken into consideration. As long 
as a household was able to get the waste water out of their house and away from their front door, 
they were happy.  
37 Barring some peasants may require constant monitoring, which may be too costly and not worth 
the effort. 
38 While these patrons are big men in their own villages, in urban terms they belong to the lower 
class or lower middle class at best. Thus their influence, outside their own villages, is fairly 
limited. 
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the household resides in an isolated village and 0 otherwise. Distance is analysed 
as a binary variable and not as a continuous one as the research design was to look 
at villages which were polar opposite, i.e. while half are situated close to the 
motorway the other half are far enough to be classified as being isolated. Within 
this setup modest changes in distance are irrelevant.39 LL is 1 if the household 
resides in a village dominated by a large landlord, 0 if it is in a peasant based 
village. Land is a continuous variable, measured in acres, capturing the amount of 
land owned by peasant households. This variable is included based on the 
argument that land owning households have higher bargaining power vis-à-vis the 
landlord as they are less dependent on him when compared to landless households 
(Scott 1976). Hence controlling for household land ownership allows us to test 
whether these households have greater access to public resources. The last four 
variables are dummies for the major biraderies found in the villages included as a 
control for the social status of the household (Ahmad 1977, Cheema and 
Mohmand 2006). Bh and Kh take the value of 1 is the household belongs to the 
Bhatti or Kharral biradery respectively. An is 1 if the household is an Ansari and 
MS is 1 if the households’ biradery is Muslim Sheikh. The reference category is 
the small middle class biraderies. The variable MW*LL in Equation 2 is an 
interaction term which captures the effect of belonging to a landlord dominated 
village far from the motorway.40  
 
Connectivity is also expected to have a spillover effect on a household’s level of 
awareness. It could be argued then, that the impact of the motorway on public 
goods provision, is not a direct one through an increase in peasants’ bargaining 
power brought about by increased options, but rather an indirect effect channelled 
through increased awareness. This follows from the argument that an informed 
citizen is able to demand higher levels of public investment and should be able to 
put considerable pressure on politicians (see for example Prat and Strömberg 
2002, Besley et. al. 2002, Besley and Burgess 2002, Olsen 1982). Hence it is 
possible that Equations 1 and 2 suffer from an omitted variable bias and are over-
                                                
39 This research design was, amongst other things, driven by practical considerations, as trying to 
find the distance from the road after which villagers consider themselves isolated would have been 
extremely expensive and would have required looking at a large number of villages.  
40 The inclusion of the interaction term in Equation 2 means that MW now captures the effect of 
the road on peasant based villages only; i.e. it assumes LL is taking the value of 0. Similarly LL 
captures the effect of land tenure systems on villages close to the road only; i.e. when MW is 0. 
The effect of that variable cannot be read off the table directly, as it requires further computation.  
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estimating the effect of the road. Therefore the basic model is adjusted to include 
controls for levels of awareness:  
 
Y = α + β1MW + β2LL + β3Land + β4N + β5H + β6Bh+ β7Kh +β8An + β9MS + ξ 
     (3) 
 
Awareness is measured through two proxies; whether the household has access to 
a newspaper41 (N) and whether the household has heard about local government 
participatory bodies (H).42 The local government ordinance in Pakistan has made 
provision for four participatory bodies which are meant to facilitate participatory 
development and to increase accountability of the politician. The aim of these 
bodies is to try to mobilize civil society. However, their functionality has been 
fairly limited, ironically due to citizens being unaware of their existence 
(Kurosaki 2007). 
  
4.2. Empirical Results 
Figure 1 illustrates the level of provision of drains and paved streets across the 
different types of villages. First off, we find that households situated in isolated 
landlord dominated villages have the lowest levels of provision, both for paved 
streets and drainage systems. Moreover the figure indicates that the effect of the 
road is stronger on provision in landlord dominated villages than peasant based 
ones. Dispersed land ownership in peasant based villages has meant that, even 
when isolated, peasants have alternative options in the form of other patrons and 
so no single patron is powerful enough to withhold public resources from his 
clients. In the case of landlord based villages close to the road, the availability of 
outside options has a similar effect, as it considerably weakens the influence of 
the landlord, which also restricts his ability to appropriate public funds. Thus the 
figure highlights that isolation and inequality alone do not adversely impact the 
level of public goods provision made to the peasants. Rather it is the interaction 
                                                
41 Access simply means they are able to get information from a newspaper, irrespective of whether 
they subscribe to it themselves, are reading it at a nearby shop or friend’s house, or are having a 
friend read it to them (making it unnecessary for them to be literate).  
42 The correlation between distance from the motorway and having heard about participatory 
bodies is -0.07 while the correlation between distance to the motorway and access to a newspaper 
is 0.03. Thus there is little fear of multicolinearity biasing the results.   
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between the two that creates a monopolistic/monopsonistic patron able to exclude 
peasants in his contract with the local politician. 
 
The graphs also illustrate public spending, in all villages, being skewed towards 
the provision of drains rather than paved streets. The result seemed confusing at 
first, as villagers showed no preference for one over the other.43 There are two 
possible explanations for this. One could lie in the relative costs of the two goods. 
Drains in rural Punjab are almost never underground and at best may have been 
cemented to ensure that the waste does not flow onto the streets and goes straight 
to the main drain.44 This makes them easy and relatively cheap to construct. 
Paving streets, however, requires both materials and a certain level of skill. Given 
the limitation of funds, a politician wanting to reach the maximum number of 
constituents, may be more inclined to build drains than to pave streets. This seems 
to be the case in peasant based villages far from the road. 
 
Figure 1: Public goods provision  
 
 
A second possible explanation lies in the interaction of drains with the streets. In 
the absence of a functioning drainage system, household waste flows directly onto 
the street outside their main door. Irrespective of whether the street is paved or 
not, this creates a mess and, besides spreading diseases, makes it difficult for 
people to move around. Mud (non-paved) streets, on the other hand, are not so 
much of a problem for mobility, provided they are not covered in dirty water and 
                                                
43 Households were asked what their three main needs were. When looking at the data for 
households without paved streets and drains, it was found that the number of households listing 
these two as their needs were relatively equal.  
44 The main drain, in all villages visited, is a big pond on one side of the village.  
FOI Working Paper 2010/13    
 
22 
household waste.45 Therefore, providing paved streets in areas without drains may 
not have the desired impact. The data show that of all the households provided 
with paved streets, only 23% lack drains.  
 
The tables that follow test whether the effect of connectivity and land tenure 
systems on the households’ chances of having public goods provided to them 
holds after controlling for household-specific characteristics. Table 1, in an effort 
to get an overall idea of the impact of connectivity and land tenure systems, 
inquires whether the household has had any public good provided to it. Column 1 
presents the results using data pertaining to provision made before the 
construction of the motorway. This regression is run to test for endogeneity with 
respect to the motorway. The result is found to be negative, allowing us to rule out 
the possibility that there are some systematic differences between these eight 
villages in terms of public goods provision. Interestingly, from Column 1 we can 
see that the households’ land ownership had a positive impact on its chances of 
receiving public goods prior to 1998. Each additional acre of land increases a 
household’s chances of provision by 0.3%. This result is significant at the 1% 
level. The small percentage effect per acre implies that the beneficial impact of 
land ownership accrues mostly to the medium and large landholders. This is not 
surprising when we consider that landed households have higher bargaining 
power vis-à-vis the patron when compared to the landless, as the patron is unable 
to impose economic sanctions on them. This implies that they can demand a 
higher level of public goods in exchange for their political support of the patron 
and the political candidate he aligns with. 
 
Columns 2 to 4 look at provision made after the construction of the motorway. 
Starting with Column 2, we find that while the variable measuring isolation is 
insignificant, households residing in landlord dominated villages are 13% less 
likely to have access to public provision when compared to those residing in 
peasant based villages. Introducing the interaction term in Column 3 reveals that it 
is actually households situated in landlord dominated villages far from the 
motorway who are most disadvantaged. These households are 23% less likely to 
                                                
45 I would like to thank Hadia Majid for bringing this point to my attention. 
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have any public goods provided to them when compared to households in both 
peasant based villages and landlord based villages close to the motorway.  
 
 














Household is situated in an 
isolated village -0.028 -0.037 0.089 0.093 
 (0.35) (0.488) (0.277) (0.252) 
Household belongs to a landlord 
dominated village 
0.0134 -0.113** 0.005 0.004 
(0.63) (0.02) (0.844) (0.874) 
Household resides in an isolated 
landlord dominated village 
  -0.234*** -0.24*** 
  (0.002) (0.002) 
Amount of land owned by the 
household (acres) 
0.0034*** 0.00014 -0.0002 -0.0002 
(0.003) (0.903) (0.826) (0.813) 
Household has heard of 
participatory bodies    0.027 
    (0.682) 
Household has access to a 
newspaper    0.005 
    (0.941) 
Bhatti 0.0065 -0.0096 -0.059 -0.065 
 (0.943) (0.92) (0.544) (0.438) 
Kharral 0.128* -0.066* -0.013 -0.017 
 (0.051) (0.096) (0.656) (0.653) 
Ansari 0.153 -0.08 -0.077 -0.079 
 (0.161) (0.317) (0.331) (0.411) 
Muslim Sheikh -0.094 -0.15 -0.132 -0.059 
  (0.024) (0.158) (0.215) (0.51) 
N 383 383 383 383 
R2 0.0329 0.0228 0.034 0.0314 
Robust standard errors calculated. P-values in parentheses   *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Isolation, combined with inequality, creates a monopolist/monopsonist landlord 
who is able to maintain a large clientelist following without having to broker 
political goods for them (Michie 1981). The same does not hold for villages 
connected to the motorway. The insignificance of the land tenure system variable 
in Column 3 illustrates that, when connected to the external market, the type of 
village that peasants reside in becomes unimportant for the purpose of public 
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goods provision. These effects hold even after controlling for levels of awareness 
in Column 4. Lastly, when looking at provision made after the construction of the 
motorway, land owning households are no longer targeted for public goods 
provision as households’ land holdings is found to be insignificant. The 
insignificance of this variable highlights the beneficial impact connectivity has 
had on landless households by reducing their disadvantage with regards to public 
spending decisions.    
 
The table highlights the importance of land tenure system for public investment, 
as argued by Banerjee and Iyer (2005), but only as long as the villages are 
isolated. Once connected to the external economy, with all the options and 
opportunities that come with it, patrons are no longer able to ignore peasants in 
their contracts with politicians. Hence we find no evident disadvantage, regarding 
overall public goods provision, of living in a village dominated by a large landlord 
once connected to the road. However, given the differences between the provision 
of paved streets and drains, as illustrated in Figure 1, it is worth investigating the 
impact connectivity has had on these two goods separately. Moreover, following 
from the theoretical argument that households’ economic and social disadvantages 
lower their bargaining power vis-à-vis the patron, thus negatively impacting their 
chances of provision, the tables that follow disaggregate the data by land tenure 
systems and distance from the motorway to evaluate who within the village is 
benefitting from connectivity.  
 
As with overall provision, Table 2 first runs a test of endogeneity to check if there 
are any systematic differences based on geography, driving the differences in 
drainage provision. The result, as shown in Column 1, is found to be negative. 
However, what is significant is the households’ land ownership, at the 1% level, 
on their chances of having drains provided to them prior to 1998.   
 
Column 2 looks at provision made after the construction of the road, finding that 
it is land tenure systems and not distance from the motorway that significantly 
affects the probability of a household having drains provided. However, including 
the interaction term in Column 3 discloses that it is actually households residing 
in secluded landlord dominated villages who are most disadvantaged. These 
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households have a 45% lower chance of having access to drainage systems when 
compared to both peasant based villages and landlord based villages situated on 
the road. Thus it seems that the monopoly/monopsony power enjoyed by the 
patron in isolated landlord based villages is enabling him to direct public 
resources away from the peasants and towards himself. While walking around 
these villages it was found that the area around the landlords’ houses had perfectly 
paved streets and well functioning drains. However, as you moved away from 
their neighbourhood the quality of public goods provision tended to fall 
considerably.  
 














Household is situated far from 
the motorway 
-0.003 -0.077 0.326*** 0.32*** 
(0.946) (0.427) (0.006) (0.006) 
Household belongs to a landlord 
dominated village 
0.025 -0.23** 0.005 0.013 
(0.517) (0.012) (0.953) (0.884) 
Household belongs to a landlord 
dominated village far from the 
motorway 
  -0.45*** -0.44*** 
  (0.00) (0.00) 
Amount of land owned by the 
household (acres) 
0.003*** 0.005 0.003 0.004 
(0.002) (0.341) (0.412) (0.367) 
Household has access to a 
newspaper    -0.005 
    (0.114) 
Household has heard of 
participatory bodies    0.096 
    (0.268) 
Bhatti 0.029 0.0365 -0.096 -0.108 
 (0.766) (0.75) (0.359) (0.315) 
Kharral 0.172 -0.0383 0.15 0.130 
 (0.037) (0.759) (0.103) (0.154) 
Ansari 0.186 -0.0829 0.053 0.059 
 (0.132) (0.653) (0.783) (0.763) 
Muslim Sheikh -0.092 -0.142 -0.12 -0.113 
  (0.153) (0.41) (0.495) (0.529) 
N 383 227 227 227 
R2 0.0435 0.0666 0.0984 0.1046 
Robust standard errors calculated. P-values in parentheses   *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Furthermore, the significance of the isolation variable in Columns 3 and 4 reveals 
that the impact of the motorway is reversed on peasant based villages as far as 
drainage provision is concerned. Households residing in isolated peasant based 
villages have a higher probability of having drains provided to them. Patrons in 
these villages have been very active in securing drains for their clients,46 while 
those in connected peasant based villages chose to split public investment 
between the provision of drains and paved streets.47 These results hold even after 
controlling for households’ level of awareness. While these results are interesting, 
it is curious that household specific characteristics are found to be insignificant. 
This could be due to the impact of these variables being averaged out in the 
aggregate data. Therefore, the effect of connectivity within the different villages 
may be more evident if we disaggregate the data. Table 3 does this by splitting the 
data four ways; by distance to the road and land tenure systems. 
  
Starting with villages at varying distances form the road, we find that land tenure 
system matters for provision of drains, but only as long as the villages are 
isolated. Households living in isolated landlord dominated villages are 45% less 
likely to have drains provided when compared to equally secluded peasant based 
villages. Once connected to the road, the type of village the household resides in 
has no significant impact on its chances of provision. Secondly, while land 
ownership continues to matter for drainage provision in isolated villages, once 
connected by the road, landed households do not seem to enjoy the same 
advantage. Therefore, the evidence suggests that the increase in outside options 
has the same effect as land ownership, i.e. it provides households with alternative 
options for earning a livelihood, thus limiting the patrons’ ability to impose 
sanctions. Lastly, the adverse effect of belonging to a socially lower class biradery 
is seen only in isolated villages. Muslim Sheikh households living far from the 
motorway are 50% less likely to have drains when compared to any other 
biradery. Belonging to the Muslim Sheikh biradery in connected villages, 
however, has no significant effect. Furthermore, Ansari households are actually 
targeted for provision in villages close to the road, as they are 28% more likely to 
                                                
46 This can be seen from Figure 1.  
47 The local mayor has considerable discretion regarding the allocation of public funds between the 
various public goods in the villages. As mentioned earlier, in isolated peasant based villages the 
politician chose to invest mostly in drains while the politician in peasant based villages close to the 
road chose to split spending between drains and paved streets. 
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have drainage provision, when compared to any other biradery. Interestingly, 
Bhatti households are 19% less likely to have drains when compared to other 
biraderies in isolated villages, significant at the 5% level.  
 
Table 3: Does the household have drains? 
 

















Household is situated far from 
the motorway 
  -0.21** 0.24** 
  (0.014) (0.023) 
Household belongs to a landlord 
dominated village 
0.013 -0.45***   
(0.882) (0.00)   
Amount of land owned by the 
household (acres) 
0.0002 0.02*** 0.001 0.024*** 
(0.935) (0.00) (0.797) (0.00) 
Bhatti -0.016 -0.197** -0.05 -0.096 
 (0.871) (0.012) (0.577) (0.422) 
Kharral 0.24** -0.097 0.22** -0.019 
 (0.016) (0.357) (0.019) (0.897) 
Ansari 0.28* -0.22 0.362*** -0.132 
 (0.072) (0.249) (0.00) (0.398) 
Muslim Sheikh 0.13 -0.50*** -0.11 -0.074 
  (0.371) (0.00) (0.636) (0.784) 
N 111 116 103 124 
R2 0.0378 0.2226 0.0718 0.1224 
Robust standard errors calculated. P-values in parentheses   *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Splitting the data by land tenure systems in Columns 3 and 4 illustrates the 
positive effect of connectivity on landlord dominated villages, as those residing 
close to the motorway are 21% more likely to have drains in comparison with 
isolated landlord dominated villages. Furthermore, within these villages, Kharral 
and Ansari households are 22% and 36% more likely to have drains compared to 
all other biraderies. While the higher level of provision to the Kharrals is not 
unexpected, given that they belong to the upper class, the increased provision to 
the Ansaris is. The data reveal that it is actually the Ansari households living close 
to the motorway in landlord dominated villages who are enjoying the higher levels 
of provision. This can also be seen from Column 1 which highlights the beneficial 
impact of being an Ansari household in villages close to the motorway. 
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When focusing on peasant based villages we find that households situated in 
isolated peasant based villages are 24% more likely to have drains provided to 
them. This can be explained by the local politician’s decision to provide drains in 
villages far from the road and not focus on paved streets. In villages connected by 
the motorway, as can be seen from Figure 1, the local politicians split resources 
between drainage provision and paved streets.48 Furthermore, in peasant based 
villages land ownership has a significant impact on the households’ chances of 
having public goods provided to them. However, given the high levels of drainage 
provision in these villages, a substantial proportion of landless households have 
also been provided for.49 Lastly, it is interesting to find that in peasant based 
villages the households’ biradery has no significant impact on its chances of 
having drains provided to them. 
 
Turning next to the provision of paved streets, Table 4 analyses the impact of 
connectivity and land tenure systems on households’ chances of receiving these 
goods. As before, Column 1 first runs a test of endogeneity to analyse if there are 
any systematic differences, based on location, between the eight villages, driving 
the differences in the provision of paved streets. The test is found to be negative. 
Moreover, as with drainage provision, the pre-motorway data finds that 
households’ land ownership has a significant impact, at the 1% level, on their 
chances of having their streets paved. However, the level is not substantial.  
 
Turning to provision after the construction of the motorway, we find that 
households situated in isolated villages are 13% less likely to have their streets 
paved. Including the interaction term in Column 3 does not take away the 
significance of the motorway variable, highlighting the positive impact that 
connectivity has had on peasant based villages. The interaction term itself though, 
                                                
48 Since paving streets is more expensive than the provision of drains the exchange is not one to 
one. Moreover, the decision regarding which of the two goods to provide is purely up to the 
politician. As far as the villagers are concerned, due to low levels of provision and their resultant 
low expectations, they are happy as long as some public good is provided to them. 
49 65% of landless households had a drain provided to them in peasant based villages. 
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is insignificant. Furthermore, the positive impact of the motorway continues to 
hold even after controlling for levels of awareness in Column 4.50 
 














Household is situated in an 
isolated village 
-0.017 -0.13** -0.083* -0.084** 
(0.514) (0.021) (0.057) (0.022) 
Household belongs to a landlord 
dominated village 
0.015 -0.0018 0.027 0.027 
(0.489) (0.973) (0.737) (0.725) 
Household resides in an isolated 
landlord dominated village 
  -0.0769 -0.075 
  (0.367) (0.285) 
Amount of land owned by the 
household (acres) 
0.0006** 0.0004 0.0003 0.0004 
(0.026) (0.482) (0.478) (0.953) 
Household has access to a 
newspaper 
   -0.001 
   (0.469) 
Household has heard of 
participatory bodies    0.003 
    (0.59) 
Bhatti -0.019 0.0252 0.0065 0.006 
 (0.329) (0.678) (0.919) (0.93) 
Kharral -0.039 -0.003 0.011 0.01 
 (0.292) (0.935) (0.802) (0.79) 
Ansari -0.038 -0.033 -0.0316 -0.032 
 (0.338) (0.596) (0.603) (0.601) 
Muslim Sheikh -0.028 -0.061 -0.056 -0.056 
  (0.533) (0.437) (0.466) (0.467) 
N 383 346 346 346 
R2 0.0156 0.0506 0.0543  0.0544 
Robust standard errors calculated. P-values in parentheses   *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
To sum up, the tables above highlight three important and interconnected 
findings. Firstly, as argued by Banerjee and Iyer (2005), land tenure system 
matters for public investment, but only if villages are isolated. Isolated villages 
dominated by a large landlord are less likely to be provided with public goods 
when compared to those with a relatively egalitarian distribution of land. In 
peasant based villages, on the other hand, dispersed land ownership has led to the 
existence of a large number of patrons, each too small to exert significant control 
                                                
50 The lack of substantial variation in the results could be explained by the fact that paved streets 
are not a widely provided public good, as is evident from Figure 1. The same was found when the 
data were disaggregated and so it is not presented here. 
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over the peasants. Therefore, in order to maintain their cliental following patrons 
need to offer their clients goods and services (Michie 1981). One outcome of this 
is for the patron to include provision to his clients in his contract with the 
politician. Patrons in landlord dominated villages do not feel the same constraints, 
as their large land holdings give them monopoly/monopsony power over the 
landless peasants (Bhaduri 1977, Michie 1981). The clients whose needs patrons 
cater for in these villages are those who are economically and socially better off in 
society and thus have some leverage over the patron.  
 
Secondly, being connected by a motorway significantly increases the average 
household’s chances of having public goods provided to it. This effect is felt more 
strongly by peasants residing in villages dominated by large landlords than those 
living in peasant based villages. The presence of alternative options, at least in the 
employment market, has created competition for the large patrons, as it restricts 
the patron’s ability to impose economic sanctions, thus leading to a shift in 
relative bargaining powers in favour of the rural poor. As a result, the landlord is 
forced to broker public goods for his clients, as otherwise he runs the risk of 
losing his clientelist following (Scott and Kerkvliet 1977). Thus connectivity is 
enabling outcomes in landlord dominated villages to converge to those found in 
their peasant based counter-parts.   
 
Lastly, connectivity, and the increase in outside options that come with it, is found 
to benefit the socially and economically lower classes of village society. These are 
those members of society who are most dependent on the patron’s resources and, 
ordinarily, are least likely to withdraw their support from him due to under-
provision. However, as the construction of the motorway has provided these 
households with a viable alternative means of employment, the patron can no 
longer expect their unwavering support in the face of under-provision. Therefore 
the patron has had to channel some of the resources contracted with the politician 
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Literature on rural development documents the importance of public goods 
provision in reducing inequality, yet there is wide spread evidence of under-
provision. While efforts have been made by governments to improve provision, 
inefficiency, corruption, elite-capture and patronage politics have meant that they 
have failed to achieve the desired results (see for example Banerjee and Iyer 2005, 
Bardhan and Mookherjee 2002, Gazdar 2000, Charlton, et al. 2003). This paper 
has argued that the presence of patron-client networks has eroded the politicians’ 
incentive to provide for their constituents directly, as they are able to guarantee 
success by contracting with local patrons. Thus any provision that is made is 
brokered through a patron (Mason and Joshi 2008, Keefer 2007). The outcome of 
this has been that public goods provision to peasants largely depends on their 
bargaining power vis-à-vis the patron. Large scale inequality has allowed patrons 
to enjoy considerably higher bargaining power, enabling them to direct most 
public funds towards themselves. This situation is made considerably worse by 
the isolated nature of many rural societies, facilitating the establishment of a 
monopolist/monopsonist patron (Bhaduri 1977).  
 
This paper has explored the possibility of increasing peasants’ bargaining power 
by connecting isolated villages to the wider national economy through road 
networks. The motorway has led to a significant increase in traffic passing 
through villages, enabling villagers to take advantage of employment 
opportunities centred around servicing passing traffic. Moreover, with increased 
traffic the villagers have greater transport facilities available at fairly reasonable 
prices making it possible for them to travel to nearby towns and cities to find 
employment. The data show that, while most households did not choose to seek 
employment outside the village, a substantial proportion felt that they had the 
option available to them. These new options have made peasants feel less 
dependent on the patron and thus enabled them to question why their votes are not 
translating into increased public goods provision.  
 
The welfare implications of road networks, as found in this paper, are two-fold. 
There is an intended effect on the economic circumstances of the peasant 
household, in the form of increased employment opportunities. This helps break 
the monopsony of the landlord in the labour market, thus giving peasants the 
FOI Working Paper 2010/13    
 
32 
ability to negotiate better terms. Secondly, the motorway has a spill-over effect on 
the social dynamics within the villages. The breakdown of the patron’s 
monopoly/monopsony power should lead to an increase in the peasants’ 
bargaining power which they can use to make demands on the patron. This can be 
seen through the higher level of provision enjoyed by villagers close to the 
motorway, indicating that connectivity has resulted in the patron altering his 
contract with the local politician so as to increase provision towards the peasants. 
These benefits are being felt most by the landless and the socially lower classes 
who are most vulnerable in village society and are most likely to be excluded by a 
monopolistic patron. 
  
The policy implication drawn from this study is quite clear – it is imperative to 
connect rural villages to the outside economy so as to break their isolation and 
thus reduce the exploitative powers of the resource rich patrons. Road networks 
are one way to do this. The advantage of this policy option is two-fold. Firstly, it 
provides rural economies with much needed infrastructural development, which is 
bound to have a positive effect on agricultural growth rates. Secondly, it is not a 
politically contentious policy, as each actor in the economy has something to gain 
from it, making it easy for politicians to implement. Clients benefit as it enhances 
their mobility and creates alternative options for them. Landlords also profit 
because it increases the value of their land and makes it easier for them to travel 
back and forth. Lastly, road networks are ‘big impact’ projects which politicians 
can use in the next election to show their commitment towards providing for their 
constituents.51   
 
This paper gives a relatively easy and effective policy option that can help alter 
the bargaining powers in favour of the peasants, thus improving their welfare. 
However, this is not to say that building roads is the sole solution to the age old 
development problem. Looking at the levels of provision in villages close to the 
motorway, it is obvious that even the ‘fortunate’ ones have very low levels of 
provision. However, what the road does do is provide the stimuli needed to 
change the power dynamics in rural villages which, in turn, enables villagers to 
                                                
51 Politicians can, and do, claim credit for the construction of the road even though they had 
nothing to do with the decision making process. 
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